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The most important book in political philosophy of the last century was John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. Rawls was professor at Harvard for nearly 40 years. Amartya Sen is also a Harvard professor in both Philosophy and Economics. His latest book is dedicated to Rawls who died in 2002. On the back cover, another of Rawls’ colleagues from Harvard, Hilary Putnam, opines that Sen’s book is the most important contribution to the field since A Theory of Justice. Yet Sen’s book is in many ways a call to stop theorising about justice as Rawls did. It is an extended disagreement, not so much with the conclusions of Rawls’ book, but with the very conception of a philosophical approach to justice that lies at the heart of Rawls’ project. This is, then, a clash of the Harvard titans for the future direction of political philosophy.
The Idea of Justice is more than this too. It draws together many themes from Sen’s work over the last several decades and one should keep in mind just how wide that range is. Amartya Sen holds a Nobel Prize in economics and has done ground-breaking work in social choice theory and development economics. In this review, however, I will concentrate on Sen’s case that we should think about the project of exploring justice as a philosophical subject differently.
	What is characteristic of the Rawlsian approach to justice according to Sen? Sen locates Rawls within a tradition of political philosophy that is distinguished by two features. First, it approaches the question of justice by conceiving what perfect justice would consist in. Second, it concentrates on the justice of institutions rather than on the behaviour of the citizens who live within these institutions. Sen calls this approach ‘transcendental institutionalism’ and points out that these two features run right through the social contract tradition from Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679) on. Transcendental institutionalism as a methodological orientation in political philosophy abstracts away the contingency in existing social arrangements and asks what an ideally just order would be. It takes into account only those features of humanity that cannot be transcended. 
We have different versions of it in part because different thinkers have different views about what aspects of humanity cannot be transcended. So, for example, Hobbes supposed that psychological egoism and a rough equality of human abilities are the two fixed points that political theorising must begin from. Given these non-contingent facts, absent some political authority, the state of nature must ensue. Given how horrible that must be, any political arrangement that allows us to escape it is just and the content of its sovereign’s commands equivalent to the content of justice within that community. 
In Rawls’ case, we are to imagine the principles for the distribution of basic goods (e.g. basic rights and liberties, income and wealth) that free and equal citizens would agree to behind the ‘veil of ignorance’. That is, we arrive at principles of justice by imagining what bargain we would strike with one another if sources of partiality were removed. So, the veil of ignorance imaginatively suspends our actual knowledge of our race, sex, intelligence, health and so on. Rawls supposed, not implausibly, that we would agree that principles agreed to behind the veil of ignorance would be fair. Hence his notion of justice as fairness. The important point to observe here is that, first, these principles constitute an ideal of justice, and, second, that the emphasis in Rawls’ imaginative experiment is on the content of the high-level principles that would, in turn, determine the structure of the most fundamental political and economic institutions of a just society.
	By contrast, Sen is interested in a philosophical orientation toward justice that is comparative and focuses on the realisation of justice in the lives of citizens. This approach Sen calls ‘realization-focused comparison’ and he identifies Adam Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx and the British utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as fellow members of this tradition. Clearly what holds this disparate collection together must be methodological, not commitment to a philosophically substantive body of doctrine. The common thread, according to Sen, is the idea that the task of political philosophy is to compare actually existing social orders in all their messy, historical contingency – to ask which among these imperfectly just orders is better ​and how we may move toward more justice rather than less. Sen also wants to focus on outcomes more than on institutions. This is not, he says, to embrace a consequentialist orientation equivalent to that of the utilitarians Mill and Bentham. One can evaluate the justice of what he calls ‘comprehensive outcomes’ that include both concrete consequences for individuals (e.g. someone gets medical attention) and also the process by means of which he gets it (e.g. through a national health insurance system or through a lottery).
	Why, one might well ask, are these projects not complementary? It is certainly true that in political theories of justice one could ‘make the best the enemy of the good,’ as the saying goes. Moreover, we might waste a lot of time thinking the philosophical problem of trying to discover what justice is and not spend enough time changing the world so as to make it a more just place. But this tension between discovery and application is not particular to political philosophy and neither is the tendency to overlook the better by dint of too much attention on the best. It can happen in science or engineering as easily as in political philosophy. So why should we relinquish the Rawlsian ‘transcendental institutionalism’ for Sen’s ‘realization-focused comparative’ approach to justice?
	A direct answer to this question is not easy to glean from Sen’s book. His chapter ‘Rawls and Beyond’ does not, to my mind, contain any single knock-out blow. But it may well be that the collective criticisms make an effective case for moving on to a different research project. The most powerful argument in Sen’s armoury is concern about whether the absence of bias or partiality is enough to isolate uniquely the perspective of justice. Explaining this criticism requires some explanation of Rawls.
	A key concept in A Theory of Justice is the notion of the ‘original position’. Rawls uses it to transform the question ‘what are the just institutions in terms of which social cooperation would take place among free and equal citizens?’ into the question ‘what principles would free and equal citizens, reasoning under conditions that are fair, adopt as guidelines for the construction of a constitution?’ The original position is the key to converting the first question to the second. It is a thought-experiment in which we imagine each member of a political community as being represented by a counterpart who knows less than he or she does – someone behind the veil of ignorance discussed above. The original position also serves to explain why Rawls’ political philosophy is properly seen as belonging to the contractarian tradition since our counterparts in the original position are entering into a contract on our behalf. They know that not all members of society share the same idea of what is a fulfilling and satisfying life. They are aware of religious diversity and other sources of different views about what is valuable. They know that the society is in a position of moderate scarcity, so that while all may have enough, it is not the case that every citizen can have everything that he or she might want. They also know that citizens have interests in possessing ‘primary goods’ – that is, things like basic rights and liberties, such as freedom of movement, as well as resources like income, wealth, positions of responsibility and associated things such as self-respect and recognition. These primary goods are things that can be used to make a success of one’s life regardless of the specific content of one’s life goals. They are ‘all-purpose tools’ for realising whatever one’s conception of the good life might be. However, the contractors in the original position do not know what their individual conception of a good life might turn out to be. Neither do they know the race, gender, religion or their talents – whether they are intelligent or not, hard-working or not, possessed of good or poor social skills and so on. Finally, they do not know the political or economic system of the society, nor its level of development. 
	Rawls argued that such contractors in the original position would agree to two principles for structuring constitutional arrangements. 
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
a) They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
These principles are prioritised. No considerations arising from the second could over-ride the first. Thus, even if it were possible to trade off some basic liberties against the goal of benefiting the least well-off, this could not be permitted. Moreover, the two conditions of the second principle are similarly prioritised. You can’t trade off equality of opportunity for a better situation for the community’s least well-off members.
Rawls thought of the difference principle as a much more intuitive and less radical principle for determining when inequalities are justified than Mill and Bentham’s principle of utility (‘bring about the greatest good for the greatest number’). The latter could justify some extreme inequalities if this, in fact, maximised overall utility. He also supposed that it was far more realistic than absolute egalitarianism since it recognised the potentially beneficial results of incentives (in the form of inequalities) to realise one’s talents. But since one’s talents are yet another contingency about oneself, the rewards that flow from them are not deserved in any ultimate sense. It is simply that allowing some inequalities makes those who are less well-off better off than they would have been in any more equal distribution of primary goods. 
Is this too abstract to tell us anything about how to make the actual world a more just place? It does not take much reflection to show that the institutions that structure the distribution of benefits in neoliberal states such as Australia manifestly fail the test of the difference principle. The ten most highly paid executives in Australia make about 200 times the average annual full-time worker’s wage. Not even the denizens of the Centre for Independent Studies could seriously maintain that any lesser inequalities than the presently existing ones would make the least well-off Australians even worse off. 
After arriving at the principles of justice, Rawls imagines his hypothetical contractors being given progressively more information so as to design just institutions of governance. First they would have access to the kind of facts that would allow them to determine whether citizens raised within institutions structured by these principles could agree to abide by them. That is, there is a check to see whether these principles can stably order a society over time. Since Rawls thought that the two principles coincided with each citizen’s good, they could form the basis of a stable social order. Next, the contractors would need to agree to a principle of just savings. If you don’t know into which generation in a society you will be born, it would be in your interest to adopt a principle that commits the society to giving each generation a ‘fair go’. (Here too, it is not hard to see the concrete and practical application of this insight in the context of climate change.) Rawls then imagines that the contractors are given progressively more information in order to develop in stages the general and specific institutions of a just society, moving from general constitutional questions that translate the ‘basic rights and liberties’ of the first principle into more concrete manifestations like ‘freedom of association’, and then from the constitutional to the more concrete level, and finally to the role of judges and administrators within the legal framework thus articulated.
The resulting theory of justice is political in a quite specific sense for Rawls. It is independent of any citizen’s particular ‘comprehensive doctrine’. A ‘comprehensive doctrine’ for Rawls is roughly each citizen’s answer to the big questions about what is right or wrong, fulfilling or pointless, pleasing to God or permissible in a God-less universe of cooling matter. The theory of justice depends on an overlapping consensus that rejects the use of coercion to bring others around to your comprehensive doctrine. 
To return to the main thread of Sen’s argument, in A Theory of Justice Rawls claimed that contractors in the original position would unanimously arrive at just these two principles. Sen doubts that this is so. Sen illustrates his doubt with a thought experiment of his own. You need to adjudicate a dispute about the possession of a flute among three children: Anne, Bob and Carla. Suppose that only Anne can play the flute. Reasoning from a utilitarian perspective, one person will think that the just resolution is to give it to her since doing so is likely to contribute to overall happiness to a greater extent than any alternative course of action. She, after all, can enjoy the toy as neither of the other children can. However, suppose that Bob has no toys at all and that Anne and Carla have many. Reasoning from an egalitarian perspective, a person should think that justice requires that Bob’s stock of toys be increased (though one might also want to allow that the children could make voluntary exchanges of toys). Finally, suppose that it turns out that Carla has invested many hours of labour in the making of the flute. Someone reasoning from a vaguely libertarian point of view will insist that she deserves the fruits of her labour. This is what justice requires. All of these reasons are lacking in bias or partiality – the obstacles to the perspective of justice that Rawls’ original position is supposed to weed out. Sen argues that this illustration goes right to the heart of the transcendental–institutional project. He says: ‘At the heart of the particular problem of a unique impartial resolution of the perfectly just society is the possible sustainability of plural and competing reasons for justice, all of which have claim to impartiality and which nevertheless differ from – and rival – each other.’ (p. 12) 
	Is this a problem for Rawls? I think the answer to this question is No. The original position is not merely a device for removing partiality from our judgements about justice. It actually combines that removal with several other goals. The contractors in the original position have a healthy measure of self-interest and they are also mindful of the fact that the society in which they find themselves may contain divergent comprehensive doctrines. Our hypothetical contractors are liberal citizens who neither want to impose, nor to have imposed upon them, moral views that it is not rationally obligatory to adopt. Hence the product of their reasoning is a specifically political  and liberal notion of justice – one that floats free of more specific moral commitments. It is thus no criticism of Rawls’ project that there are competing principles of justice that we can urge in specific cases without betraying partiality or bias. The question is whether these principles would stand the test for a specifically liberal and political conception of justice.
	There is much more in the first part of Sen’s book that tries to spell out exactly what is wrong with the Rawlsian approach to justice as fairness. Some of it is detailed criticism. However, two overarching themes emerge. First, Sen is unhappy with the Rawlsian project because it seeks to derive principles of justice from a hypothetical, closed community of contractors. This is quite natural if we think of the primary unit of political activity as a nation-state and we are trying to construct a specifically political theory of justice. Sen wants a theory of justice that acknowledges that we do not relate to others on the planet simply as (for example) Australians to Sudanese. People relate as women (who happen to be in Australia) to women (who happen to be in Sudan) or as opponents of the cruel treatment of animals worldwide. Second, Sen thinks that the project of deriving principles of justice that would gain the unanimous assent of the parties to the contract is problematic. We should rather take on board the lessons of social choice theory and rest content with partial orderings of alternatives. 
	In response to this first well-known limitation of Rawls’ theory of justice, some Rawlsians like Thomas Pogge have argued that we should conduct Rawls’ thought-experiment from a global perspective. (This differs from Rawls’ own approach to justice across boarders. Rawls imagines representatives of political communities in a second iteration of the original position that will produce a framework for justice between nations.) Sen is dismissive of the global Rawlsians on the grounds that we have no prospect of a world government. But we do have an existing set of institutions with global reach, like the UN, and global Rawlsians like Pogge argue with these world bodies on detailed policy issues.
	With respect to the second issue, we return to the question of whether there is a real incompatibility between the traditional, transcendental approach and Sen’s desire for more interest in comparative judgments concerning the relative desirability of various alternatives. Sen traces the transcendental approach back to Hobbes, but of course it goes much further. Both Plato’s and Aristotle’s political writings contain elaborations of the ideal city-state. These ideals differ from modern liberal ones by making the self-actualisation of their citizens the goal, rather than enshrining at their core a liberal notion of individual autonomy. Nonetheless, Plato’s elaboration of the ideally just city-state in Republic also includes judgments about the relative merits of alternative constitutions. Historically, there simply is no incompatibility between the ideal–transcendental approach and Sen’s emphasis on comparative assessments of the justice of different political arrangements.
	The second part of Sen’s book focuses on a different aspect of Rawls’ work. Sen calls this section ‘the materials of justice’, for it concerns what we are seeking a just distribution of. If you are a utilitarian or a welfare economist, then you think that a just distribution gets things right with respect to utility. So if, for instance, you were a preference utilitarian like Peter Singer, then you’d evaluate the justice of institutions by their tendency to maximise preference satisfaction. Rawls concentrates on the distribution of resources. His ‘primary goods’ are things like income, wealth, powers and prerogatives of offices, and the social bases of self-respect. These are universal means – all-purpose tools – for realising any conception of a good life that an agent might have. Sen, by contrast, is famous as the originator of the capabilities approach. On this approach, an individual’s advantage is ‘judged by [his or her] capability to do things that he or she has reason to value’ (p. 231). Sen claims that he is concerned with the freedom to do that which a person has reason to value, rather than the actual realisation of a person’s valued ends (pp. 235–8). The relation of the freedom at the heart of Sen’s capabilities approach to a person’s well-being is complex. Normally a person who is free to achieve that which she has reason to value both values her own well-being and takes steps to achieve this. But this need not be inevitably so. So Sen distinguishes among (1) well-being achievement, (2) agency achievement, (3) well-being freedom, and (4) agency freedom. (2) and (4) concern the agent’s goals – not merely the unreflective ones, but the ones the agent would have upon thorough reflection. Some agents may have good reasons to prioritise some goals over their own well-being. 
Which one of these does the capabilities approach regard as the important one – the material of justice? Sen’s answer is that in different contexts we’ll have reasons to care about each of them. If we are concerned with deprivation, then our focus is likely to be on (1): justice requires that those living in extreme poverty should achieve well-being. If we are concerned with adults in relatively affluent political communities, then a concern for justice is often a concern for (4): justice requires that if same-sex couples want to be married, they can marry. There is no way to say, in advance, how one would resolve conflicts between these different notions of what a person’s advantage consists in. Thus Sen’s views on the material of justice support his earlier criticism of transcendental institutionalism. We cannot say in the abstract what an ideally just set of institutions would be because what justice is concerned with may be importantly different in different cases. 
In this phase of the book too, Sen argues against Rawls’ approach, which treats resources and opportunities as the matter of justice. One argument concerns the conversion of resources into the achievement of well-being or other goals. Poverty, Sen suggests, should not be thought of as deprivation of resources, but as deprivation of capability. To concentrate on resources such as income can lead us to ignore contingencies that can make it difficult to convert resources into the actualisation of capacities. So, for instance, members of a community suffering from disabilities may require significantly higher levels of income to achieve the same levels of functioning as those who are not. To treat justice as a matter of the distribution of resources may lead us to miss this fact.
Rawlsians should agree that thinking about justice in terms of the distribution of resources may do this, but it need not. The case parallels Sen’s earlier complaint that concentrating on what ideally just institutions would look like may lead us to ignore ways – ways well short of the best – in which we could make this better. It may, but it need not.
Do these criticisms mean that I think that Sen’s book fails in its purpose because it does not give those engaged in the Rawlsian project compelling reasons to turn their energies to Sen’s project? No, not at all. In his famous book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn pointed out that sometimes a particularly successful bit of science, like Newton’s Principia, establishes a paradigm. It becomes a model that defines a field of problems to be solved and a general approach to solving them. 
The same thing can happen in philosophy – or at least in the Anglo-analytic tradition that is predominant in the US and Australia. The hard, detailed work of solving the problems left in the wake of a paradigm-defining work Kuhn called ‘normal science’. In normal science, we can see progress and we tend to see an increasing level of consensus. Anomalies may emerge that will resist repeated efforts to resolve them within the established methods of the paradigm. If and when enough of these add up, there may be a scientific revolution. Kuhn notes, however, that those who are engaged in normal science will have good reasons for thinking that the paradigm within which they are working will go on. You may not be able to argue them into seeing it differently, so long as they think they are still making progress. 
I think Sen is in this position. He is urging a change of paradigm while many philosophers still think that the Rawlsian one has plenty of life left in it. In philosophy, as in other areas of science, it is easier to dispute a received answer than to convince everyone that we should ask a different question. 
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